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Rethinking Microfinance: Towards relational credit 








Few ideas have been so celebrated or been capable of generating such high 
and broad worldwide expectations like microfinance. The aim of this essay 
is to critically sketch the current mainstream microfinance movement and 
to shed light on its broken promises and emerging contradictions. The 
paper claims that modern microfinance could increase its internal as well as 
external sustainability as a development tool by rediscovering some of the 
key principles underpinning relational credit practices as historically 
testified by a number of bank cooperatives, popular banks and mutual-loan 
guarantee societies. In conclusion the paper suggests principles to re-










Over the last thirty years microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been 
celebrated as the most powerful and potentially self-sustaining institutional 
devices for triggering bottom-up processes of development and poverty 
reduction (Andreoni, 2013a). Microfinance consists in the provision of a 
wide spectrum of micro-financial services, mainly microcredit, 
microsaving and microinsurance, to those segments of the populations that 
are excluded from mainstream commercial banks as a result of their lack of 
collaterals. Very often MFIs rely upon alternative financial techniques such 
as various forms of group lending or dynamic incentives as well as tailored 
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credit processes that allow them to overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (Andreoni and Pelligra, 2009).  
Over the last fifteen years the „mainstreamization‟ of microfinance has 
been increasingly transforming the original key features of this global 
movement. The aim of this essay is to critically sketch the current 
mainstream microfinance movement and to shed light on its broken 
promises and emerging contradictions (Dichter and Harper, 2007; Bateman 
and Chang, 2012). The first step will be to frame modern microfinance in 
the specific historical-political moment in which it was re-discovered and 
to show how this rediscovery involved a profound misunderstanding of the 
nature of microfinance and its limits, both in terms of its overall socio-
economic impact and sustainability.  
The paper will claim that microfinance today could benefit enormously 
from rediscovering the institutional models of bank cooperatives, popular 
banks and mutual-loan guarantee societies and all those financial 
institutions which in different historical moments and contexts experienced 
the common philosophy of what we call „relational credit‟(Andreoni and 
Pelligra, 2009). Specifically, the sustainability of microfinance as an 
institutional innovation for economic development depends upon its 
capacity to rediscover a set of principles underpinning relational credit 
practices. They are: (i) horizontal credit-debt relationships; (ii) high 
proximity between credit and savings; (iii) strong interlink between credit 
and production; (iv) scalability from micro to meso institutions by coop-
networking. 
 
1. Mainstreaming microfinance: promises or illusions? 
Today‟s microfinance can been seen as the result and, at the same time, one 
of the main drivers of a new „developmentalist‟ discourse which has been 
emerging gradually since the late 1970s, achieving its most clear 
manifestation in the Millenium Development Goals Agenda. As it has been 
stressed by Ha-Joon Chang (2010:2), „development has come to mean 
poverty reduction, provision of basic needs, individual betterment, 
sustenance of existing productive structure – that is, anything but 
„development‟ in the traditional sense‟. On the contrary, classical 
development economists such as Albert Hirschman, Gunnar Myrdal and 
Nicholas Kaldor shared a common idea of development as a circular and 
cumulative process of structural transformation and increasing productive 
capabilities (Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2013). A central role in this process 
was given to the so called „developmental state‟, a pragmatic and strategic 
political actor capable of mastering market forces towards a qualitative 
transformation of the socio-economic system. Of course, banks were 
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considered central infrastructures and fundamental partners in this process 
of structural change through increasing productive and technological 
capabilities.  
With the rise of the Neoliberal ideology and the retreat of the State, 
during the 1980s multilateral organization such as the World Bank, aid 
agencies such as USAID and policy makers started relying on NGOs, 
especially microcredit institutions, for promoting development and poverty 
reduction. These last two words came to be used interchangeably and 
microfinance, as well as other institutions in the social economy, were 
elevated to being the most effective and market friendly strategies for the 
achievement of these goals. This new „developmental discourse‟ in which 
the word micro was preferred to the macro, found an important support 
also in the United Nations Agencies, although for different reasons. As 
Mahbub ul Haq has said, after years in which people were placed at the 
margin of the development discourse, it was felt necessary „to put people at 
the centre of development‟. Moreover, as Sen (1997:7) clearly stressed, the 
great appeal of this new „alternative paradigm‟ derived from the rejection 
of a „blood, sweat and tears‟ (to use Churchill‟s rousing phrase) vision of 
development‟. Microfinance institutions were immediately recognized, 
along with others such as fair trade coops, social enterprises etc., as the 
perfect institutional devices for enabling people's agency and cooperation 
and the expansion of individual freedom and capabilities.  
Since the early 1990s, on the basis of these promises the microfinance 
sector has been increasingly pumped with private and public donors funds, 
multilateral organization aid and, especially in the last decade, private 
investment. Astonishingly, as many have documented, these choices were 
made without any clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the microfinance sector, without any reliable empirical evidence about the 
impact that MFIs had been able to achieve up to that point (Roodman and 
Morduch 2009; Duflo et al., 2013) and, finally with a new ideologically 
driven vision of microfinance, „the commercial microfinance model‟. Now, 
to understand the present state of microfinance, it is necessary to analyze 
how and why the „commercial microfinance model‟ had generated so many 
contradictions. In doing that, I will focus on three different dimensions: the 
institutional transformation of MFIs, the impact on their microclients and 
the impact on the socio-economic context in which they operate.  
 
2. The commercial model: the ‘internal’ sustainability 
The commercial microfinance model was launched in the wake of a new 
mantra clearly reported in the Pink Book (2004), the CGAP guidelines for 
MFIs: „microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very 
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large numbers of people. Unless microfinance providers charge enough to 
cover their costs, they will always be limited by scarce and uncertain 
supply of subsidies from donors and governments‟. The basic idea behind 
the „commercial microfinance model‟ is that microfinance can be a win-win 
strategy for poverty reduction. In order to get a win-win result, MFIs have 
to become financially self-sustainable and in the medium-long term have to 
reach a certain level of profitability. It is claimed that only in this way will 
MFIs be able to attract and channel private funds into the sector and to 
reach on a stable basis the huge demand of microfinance services in 
developing countries (breadth outreach). To become financially self- 
sustainable (not simply operationally self-sufficient) MFIs have to achieve 
a critical mass of microclients which would permit them to benefit from 
economies of scale and, thus, to reduce the high unit costs associated to 
microservices. The interest rates, as well as the provision of costly 
complementary non-financial services has to follow the same logic, in other 
words, quantity has to be preferred to quality.  
However, as many case studies demonstrate, the commercial 
microfinance model does not stimulate the accomplishment of a more 
fundamental goal, which is increasing operational efficiency by innovating 
processes and products (Balkenhol 2007; Andreoni, Sassatelli and Vichi, 
2013). In fact, being financially self-sufficient does not imply that the MFI 
is operating at the maximum possible level of efficiency. Very often their 
financial sustainability is only the result of the lack of competition in their 
sector, namely the possibility to apply usurious interest rates. For this 
reason, instead of blindly pursuing financial sustainability at the cost of 
social performance, the central problem to tackle here should be „how 
much innovation and increasing efficiency can modify the nature of the 
trade-offs and increase the range of possible options' (Simanowitz 
2007:63).  Now, how are microclients affected by this profound process of 
institutional transformation?  
 
3. The impact at the micro-level: the microclients 
It is evident that evaluating the impact of microfinance requires a 
multidisciplinary approach and the application of different methodologies 
(Andreoni, 2013b).  A recent paper by Roodman and Morduch (2009), has 
attempted an interesting critical assessment of the most-noted econometric 
studies on the impact of microcredit on households. They found that after 
thirty years „we have little solid evidence that [microfinance] improves the 
lives of clients in measurable ways‟, although at the same time on these 
basis they cannot „conclude that microcredit harms‟ (2009:3-4).  
 5 
A promising alternative methodology in the assessment of the 
microfinance impact, as shown in the recent book Portfolios of the Poor 
(2009), is to collect systemic information on the financial practices of the 
poor. By collecting more than 250 financial diaries in three different 
contexts (Latin America, Africa and South Asia) this research has shown 
how: 
a. Firstly and paradoxically, the condition of poverty obliges a person to 
use more intensively than others a wide spectrum of formal and 
informal financial services. This intense financial life is just a response 
to the poorest or vulnerable are living on a small, irregular and uncertain 
income. 
b. Secondly, their lives are much more riskier and uncertain, which means 
that each emergency without appropriate micro insurances, savings or 
other instruments for raising lump sums can easily degenerate into 
something worse.  
c. Thirdly, different needs require different financial products so the poor 
select who are the best lenders according to the specific situations. 
Sometimes „they can even borrow to have something to save‟ 
(idem:23); being willing to pay for saving in security; paying a high 
interest rate on very short duration loans, etc. 
As a result of these dynamics poor households end up managing a complex 
web of financial relationships (or better connections in an uncertain 
context) with others – family, neighbors, moneylenders, saving clubs etc. – 
in order to respond to their everyday needs. At this point, it seems evident 
how the poor need and can benefit from financial services, even if having 
access to them simply results in a reduction of their vulnerability and 
morbidity rather than economic development. 
The crucial issue here is to understand what is the most effective 
institutional tool for providing these services. From what we have observed 
above, the commercial microfinance model is not the best candidate for a 
series of reasons. Among them the application of relatively higher interest 
rates; the preference accorded to individual lending methodologies which 
reproduce in relational terms, a vertical credit-debt relationship; the 
oversupply of financial services even when the poor will not benefit from 
them or have not shown a sufficient debt capacity; and finally, the huge 
reduction in the provision of complementary non-financial services such as 
the establishment of market linkages for inputs and outputs, the building of 
common infrastructures, business and technical training etc., all elements 
which are crucial for making credit more productive. 
 
4. The impact at the macro level: the ‘external’ sustainability 
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Scholars addressing the „macro-limitations‟ of microfinance as a tool for 
triggering sustainable economic development have stressed three 
fundamental issues (Bateman and Chang, 2012): 
a. The micro scale of the investments and firms seems to limit the 
possibility of benefit from economies of scale in production; 
b. The investment in very simple „no tech / no-capital‟ microenterprises 
seems to do not facilitate the accumulation of productive capabilities 
in key manufacturing activities in the local economy; 
c. The inherent fallacy of composition affecting microfinance schemes. 
This last point deserves particular attention as it calls in cause the external 
sustainability of microfinance. As Pollin (2007:2) was among the first to 
note, microenterprises „need a  vibrant, well-functioning domestic market 
itself that encompasses enough people with enough money to buy what 
these enterprises have to sell. Finally, micro business benefit greatly from 
an expanding supply of decent wage-paying jobs in their local economies‟. 
In other words, even if the microfinance sector were able to finance new 
„small tech/small capital‟ enterprises, relying only on supply side measures 
would not be enough. The reason for this, as Allyin Young (1928) clearly 
explained in his classical paper on increasing returns, is that „the extent of 
the market‟, which is nothing more than the market demand for final and 
intermediate goods,  is a fundamental driver for the growth of the economic 
system and its advancement in terms of division of labour.  This reflection 
is supported in a recent paper by Chowdury (2009:7) in which exponential 
expansion of microfinance „seems to have created a mistaken belief among 
advocates of microfinance that supply creates its own demand a la Say‟s 
law. The reality is that the supply of credit and other complementary 
supply-side factors cannot drive the growth of viable business if the market 
itself does not expand rapidly‟. 
 
5. Rediscovering relational credit practices for sustainability  
In order to reimagine a microfinance model for the future we need to 
rediscover the innovative financial practices successfully undertaken in the 
old days by various types of financial institutions (Andreoni and Pelligra, 
2009; Andreoni, 2013a). In particular, looking at the history of the Mons 
Pietatis, the most important institutional innovation of the Italian 
Renaissance or at the first credit cooperatives, popular banks and mutual 
loan guarantee societies which spread in all Europe over the XIX century, 
we discover that all these experiences were initially created for providing 
financial services to a multitude of micro and small economic actors such 
as artisans, farmers, micro and small local entrepreneurs, etc.  Now, one 
 7 
might assume that these institutions were inspired by the same vision as the 
modern microfinance movement. However, saying that their vision was 
simply a micro-finance one would be very reductive. In fact the profound 
innovation of the old microfinance movement, which is disappearing in 
modern microfinance, is a relational-finance vision rooted in specific 
relational-credit practices. As we will see sketching out some stylized facts 
taken from the history of these institutions, the concept of relational credit 
does not refer simply to the adoption of group lending methodologies with 
joint liability (i.e the social collateral argument) but involves different 
patterns of financial and non-financial relations among people in a certain 
context. Let‟s start by looking in a comparative perspective at the historical 
emergence of credit cooperatives and popular banks. By analyzing these 
experiences we will delineate the principles behind the concept of relational 
credit practices. 
The first credit cooperatives based on the Hermann Schulze Delitzsch 
and Fredrich Raiffeisen models were born during the 19th century in 
Germany and spread with different names and institutional forms such as 
credit unions and saving banks in all continental Europe, Japan, Canada, 
and America, in this last case with the Morris Plan banks. The Credit 
Cooperatives a là Rafaissen were mostly concentrated in the rural areas, 
while the cooperatives a là Schulze, which in Italy came to be known as 
Popular Banks, operated in urban areas. In general, the Credit 
Cooperatives‟ members, regardless of their income, had the chance to 
become members of the bank, although initially very often as savers more 
than as borrowers. Moreover, all members usually came from the same 
local parish, ran their businesses in the same markets and had learned their 
job working in the same workshops. As for the governance, credit 
cooperatives were owned and controlled by their own members according 
to the rule of „one head one vote‟, which guaranteed, during the frequent 
meetings a democratic participation of all bank members. During these 
meetings, the members used to define the interest rates, to evaluate the 
credit/trust-worthiness and debt capacity of potential borrowers, the amount 
of savings deposited by the members, and sometimes, ended in 
coordinating joint initiatives for example by establishing market linkages 
for inputs and outputs. Many of their financial relationships were so 
heavily intertwined with their different productive activities that we can 
more insightfully look at them as material credit-debt relationships. With 
this respect it is also interesting to notice that those cooperatives operating 
in rural areas developed specific financial products which better responded 
to the specific needs of agricultural activities, namely long term loans; 
while those banks working with artisans and merchants in urban areas 
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provided small and short-term loans as a response to the fact that in these 
activities the financial turnover is faster and there is a continuous need of 
working capital. Moreover, while the member-owners of rural cooperatives 
had an unlimited joint liability, popular banks in growing cities adopted a 
personal limited liability. This choice was clearly an effective strategy 
considering how people‟s mobility and anonymity is higher in urban 
contexts than in rural ones. As a result, in the rural credit cooperatives the 
deposits were longer term, the interest rates were almost constant, the 
bank‟s liquidity was quite low, and, finally, members ended to perceive the 
bank as “an extension of their own business” (Prinz 2002).  
The adoption of a so peculiar model of ownership and governance had 
crucial implications on bank cooperatives members, their patterns of 
financial and non-financial relations, and the broader context.  
Firstly, the financial relations were embedded in a dense network of 
horizontal personal relations.  Since all the members had the opportunity to 
be at the same time, or in different moments in time, borrowers, savers, 
bankers and entrepreneurs meant that their system of interaction was 
articulated in a horizontal relational structure. The institutional 
arrangements of these cooperative banks were shaped by this relational 
context.  Even those more marginalized people in the community who were 
not able to have access to large amounts of credit, were not excluded from 
the bank and their small savings were channeled in more productive „small 
tech/small capital‟ activities. 
Secondly, the fact that all the financial resources saved were reinvested 
in the same community enabled the maintenance of a high level of 
‘proximity’ between credit and savings. In other words, what is saved is 
reinvested in a circular process. This property is particularly important as it 
responds to the need, mentioned above, for a coordinated increase in 
supply-side and demand-side factors.   
Thirdly, an important part of the credit was oriented towards productive 
activities and re-production of the credit system. In other words, the 
financial activities were functionally linked to productive activities and 
financial products and services were designed according to the specific 
needs and features of the borrowers and their micro and small enterprises.  
Finally, after WW2, by adopting small institutional adjustments and 
relying on coop-networking strategies, many of these banks have been able 
to contribute massively to the process of development and structural change 
of many of today‟s most successful European Regions. For example, in 
Emilia Romagna and Trentino Alto Adige, where there has been a 
historically strong credit cooperative movement, we find today the highest 
ratio of bank branches to people, the highest level of financial inclusion, the 
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highest presence of micro and small enterprises, and the lowest level of 
usury. Not only have these financial institutions shown a high degree of 
resilience, but also a high capacity for reinventing themselves and 
collaborating with other actors (Andreoni, Sassatelli and Vichi, 2013).  The 
story of Confidi, the Italian mutual loan-guarantee societies is a good 
example of this. Adapting the principles illustrated above, these institutions 
whose members are SMEs operating in different sectors, especially in the 
manufacturing, have been developing interesting practices of relational 
credit. Instead of recycling their own savings into investments which would 
have required creating a bank, they have constituted guarantee funds which 
can be used by all members every time they apply for a loan in a 
cooperative or commercial bank. As a result, those enterprises affiliated to 
these confidi can benefit from a higher chance of receiving credit, and 
generally pay a lower interest rate since part of the investment risk is 
covered by the business community, not the bank. 
Of course, many others institutional formulae have been designed 
according to the specific socio economic context in which they have 
emerged. However, those financial institutions which have been developing 
relational credit practices not only have provided the poor with 
microfinance services but also have contributed in a broader sense to a 
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